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Abstract
Elections are held in nearly all countries in the contemporary world. Yet despite their aim of allowing for peaceful
transfers of power, elections held outside of consolidated democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence.
This special issue introduction article establishes electoral violence as a subtype of political violence with distinct
analytical and empirical dynamics. We highlight how electoral violence is distinct from other types of organized
violence, but also how it is qualitatively different from nonviolent electoral manipulation. The article then surveys
what we have learned about the causes and consequences of electoral violence, identifies important research gaps in
the literature, and proceeds to discuss the articles included in the special issue. The contributions advance research in
four domains: the micro-level targeting and consequences of electoral violence, the institutional foundations of
electoral violence, the conditions leading to high-stakes elections, and electoral violence in the context of other forms
of organized violence. The individual articles are methodologically and geographically diverse, encompassing ethno-
graphy, survey vignette and list experiments and survey data, quantitative analyses of subnational and crossnational
event data, and spanning Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
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Introduction
The institution of elections is virtually ubiquitous in the
contemporary world. With the exception of a handful of
states, including Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and South Sudan, citizens today have the oppor-
tunity to elect their leaders in national elections. Elec-
tions are held even during periods of armed conflict; for
example, since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan
in 2001, voters have gone to the polls eight times. In
theory, the employment of elections to select leaders
ought to provide a nonviolent alternative to the use of
force to adjudicate between rival claims to rule, and it
ought to be a mechanism that allows citizens greater say
over how they are governed. Yet in practice, these expec-
tations often fail to conform to reality. Many elections,
especially those in democracies not yet fully consoli-
dated, are fraught with significant levels of violence dur-
ing the campaign period, on polling day or in the
aftermath of voting. Electoral violence can result in casu-
alty tolls that meet the threshold of civil war within days
or weeks; when this occurs, it can undo years of peace
building and development work, it can undermine dem-
ocratic institutions, and it can even trigger civil war.
Post-election violence after the 2010 polls in Coˆte
d’Ivoire led to more than 1,000 civilian deaths, one
million internally displaced people and 100,000 refugees
in neighboring countries. Recent elections in
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Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Zimbabwe were similarly accompanied
by high levels of conflict. Violence, even at levels below
that witnessed in the most egregious cases, undermines
the democratic character of elections by substituting free
choice with coercion and by deterring participation.
When force intrudes into electoral processes, something
is seriously amiss with democratic institutions.
Given the substantive relevance of electoral violence
as a problem, it is important for academic researchers to
have a clear understanding of its prevalence, causes, and
dynamics, as well as what can be done to prevent it.1 The
study of electoral violence has grown out of two largely
independent streams in political science – the literature
on conflict and political violence, on the one hand, and
the literature on electoral misconduct, on the other.
Scholars of security and conflict first became inter-
ested in elections following work on democratization and
its conflict-inducing risks that implied a potential rela-
tionship between elections and violence (Snyder, 2000;
Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Subsequent research further
examined elections as a trigger for civil war and the
potentially destabilizing consequences of elections after
the end of civil war (Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Ceder-
man, Gleditsch & Hug, 2012; Chaco´n, Robinson &
Torvik, 2011; Cheibub & Hayes, 2017; Flores & Noor-
uddin, 2012, 2016; Matanock, 2017), the short- and
long-term electoral implications of civil war (Balcells,
2012; Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015), and the relationship
between patterns of political violence and the electoral
cycle (Davenport, 1997; Goldsmith, 2015; Harish &
Little, 2017).
Working largely separately, scholars of elections out-
side the Western world have long been interested in the
subversion of electoral processes through practices such
as clientelism, vote-buying, and intimidation (Birch,
2007, 2011; Mares & Young, 2016; Norris, 2014; Sche-
dler, 2013). Electoral violence is conceptualized as one of
several tools elites can use to influence election outcomes
(Birch, 2011, 2020; Daxecker, Di Salvatore & Ruggeri,
2019; van Ham & Lindberg, 2015; Mares & Young,
2016; Norris, Frank & Martı´nez i Coma, 2015; Sche-
dler, 2002). Yet this literature has until recently focused
more on particularistic rewards, neglecting the possibility
that the determinants and implications of coercive stra-
tegies could be quite distinct (Mares & Young, 2016).
The aim of this special issue is twofold: first, we
establish electoral violence as a strategy used by political
actors to influence the course and outcome of electoral
contests, and provide a conceptual approach for under-
standing the distinctiveness of electoral violence. Sec-
ond, we address noteworthy gaps in scholarly
understanding of this topic. Whereas previous research
has advanced knowledge pertaining to the institutional,
social, and international underpinnings of electoral vio-
lence, as well as having identified important conse-
quences for political behavior and attitudes,
important gaps remain. The special issue contributes
novel insights in four domains: the micro-level target-
ing and consequences of electoral violence, the formal
and informal institutional determinants of electoral vio-
lence, how the stakes of elections are formed and influ-
ence the prospects of electoral violence, and how
electoral violence is shaped by other forms of organized
violence.
The distinctiveness of electoral violence
Electoral violence is levied by political actors to purpose-
fully influence the process and outcome of elections, and
it involves coercive acts against humans, property, and
infrastructure (Bekoe, 2012; Harish & Toha, 2019;
Ho¨glund, 2009). It can happen in all parts of the elec-
toral cycle, including at the announcement of elections,
party primaries, and voter registration (Seeberg, Wah-
man & Skaaning, 2018; So¨derberg Kovacs, 2018), and
it can be promoted by both state and non-state actors
(Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Staniland, 2014).
This conceptualization has the strategic use of violence at
its core, but alternative and complementary perspectives
exist, as developed below.
Electoral violence covers a range of different manifes-
tations and outcomes, but the concept is unified by its
coercive component. Research from the African context
suggests that harassment and intimidation are more
common than lethal violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012:
17–18, 24), despite the fact that lethal violence is gen-
erally better covered and less subject to underreporting in
the media-based sources that underlie many of the
cross-country sources capturing electoral violence (von
Borzyskowski & Wahman, 2019).2 However, violence
associated with elections can generate significant casual-
ties and form part of an escalatory process toward civil
1 For recent surveys, see Daxecker & Jung (2018), Laakso (2019),
and von Borzyskowski (2019a).
2 Threats and intimidation can be made publicly and privately,
incurring different reporting biases and leaving some forms of
violence more difficult to detect.
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war (Christensen & Utas, 2008; Ron, 2001). A survey of
relevant datasets indicates that a substantial proportion
of elections across the globe witness at least some vio-
lence. The Countries at Risk of Election Violence
(CREV) data estimate that over three quarters (78%)
of elections in countries deemed to be at risk of violence
experience at least ten violent events (Birch &
Muchlinski, 2017), while the Electoral Contention and
Violence (ECAV) data report more than three violent
events in over 50% of elections, and deadly violence in
approximately 30% of elections (Daxecker, Amicarelli &
Jung, 2019).
In order to bring the key features of electoral violence
into clearer focus, we first discuss electoral violence as
strategy, and proceed to distinguishing it from other
cognate practices, namely non-electoral violence and
nonviolent forms of electoral manipulation.
Electoral violence as strategy
The strategic perspective dominates existing literature
on electoral violence, with scholars seeking to uncover
the incentives and strategic settings that make violence
an attractive tactic for political leaders (e.g. Birch,
2020; Daxecker, 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde
& Jablonski, 2014; Smidt, 2016; Wilkinson, 2004).
Electoral violence is typically selected from among
available tools to achieve electoral ends, even if the use
of force may simultaneously deliver on other goals, as
when land is forcibly taken from a political opponent
to reward a political ally. The goals of violence gener-
ally include political exclusion, be it exclusion from
candidacy (via attacks on candidates); from campaign-
ing (via attacks on or obstruction of campaign events);
from the provision of electoral information (via attacks
on media outlets, election observers, and NGOs
involved in voter education); from electoral participa-
tion and free electoral choice (via the intimidation,
coercion, and/or the displacement of voters); from elec-
toral victory (via attacks on polling stations and poll
workers or the destruction of polling materials); or
from power (via post-electoral protests contesting the
outcome of the election).
Admittedly, there are challenges to gauge the stra-
tegic intent of violence. There are several reasons for
this. First, political actors have incentives to hide their
(illegal) involvement (Burchard, 2015: 12–13). For
this reason, political leaders often rely on violence
specialists (such as militia groups or criminal gangs)
for security and outsource coercion to such groups
(Raleigh, 2016; Staniland, 2015). In addition, while
being public in its nature, electoral violence can be
effected in private to avoid detection (Toros & Birch,
2019). Second, even when the overall objective is to
influence the electoral process, the motivations for the
individuals involved as instigators and perpetrators of
electoral violence can be different from group and
leadership goals. This makes electoral violence – like
all forms of political violence – multilayered and
diverse (So¨derberg Kovacs, 2018: 9). Acts of violence
may be driven by private motives, such as revenge
dynamics unrelated to the electoral process, or tie in
with local power struggles, disconnected from the
national-level electoral dynamics. The outsourcing of
coercion to violence specialists – militia groups or
criminal gangs – adds another layer of motives. While
such groups may have their own goals in relation to
the election, violent practices may also be a socializa-
tion tool to maintain internal cohesion, yielding a
situation where motives related to the election out-
come and socialization are intertwined (Christensen
& Utas, 2008; Laakso, 2007; Rasmussen, 2018).
Electoral and non-electoral violence
Electoral violence is distinct from other forms of orga-
nized violence in that the institutional frameworks
surrounding elections shape the ways in which vio-
lence intervenes in the electoral process. The actors,
practices, and institutions provided by the electoral
framework affect how and why electoral violence
arises, and influence both its timing and targets.
Thus, electoral violence ‘would not have occurred or
would at least have manifested itself differently in the
absence of an electoral contest’ (Fjelde & Ho¨glund,
2016b: 8).
A main challenge for the study of electoral violence is
that it often takes place in contexts where other forms of
organized violence are already pervasive, and where coer-
cion, violent actors, and weapons abound. Armed con-
flict constitutes one such context. When governments
face an insurgency, they have the choice of allowing the
political wings of armed opposition actors to compete in
elections, or barring them from competition. Insurgents
or rebel groups, for their part, engage with electoral pol-
itics in different ways and face the choice of whether to
boycott or to abandon (sometimes temporarily) armed
resistance and stand in elections (Dunning, 2011). In
some instances, armed opposition actors continue to
wage a military campaign, while simultaneously fielding
political candidates in the election (Coburn & Larson,
2014; Heger, 2015; Matanock & Staniland, 2018; Steele
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& Schubiger, 2018).3 When violence is leveraged to
influence elections by actors that concurrently seek to
overthrow the government or establish territorial control,
it can have spillover effects on broader conflict dynamics.
For instance, violence against voters and candidates can
depress voter turnout and demonstrate the government’s
failure to run secure elections, thereby undermining the
government’s overall legitimacy and ability to win the
war (Birnir & Ghodes, 2018; Condra et al., 2018). Con-
versely, the intensity and form of conflict can shape
spatial patterns of electoral violence, not only during the
course of armed conflict, but also years after (Harish &
Toha, 2019).
Electoral violence can also unfold in the context of
violent communal conflict. Communal conflicts pit non-
state groups organized along communal identities (often
ethnicity or religion) against each other. These can be
localized and disconnected from electoral dynamics,
spanning issues such as resource scarcity, land-use or
local authority (von Uexkull & Pettersson, 2018). How-
ever, the introduction of electoral processes often creates
incentives for elites to manipulate ethnic or religious
cleavages for electoral benefits (Wilkinson, 2004). Such
manipulation can trigger communal violence that serves
electoral ends, but with long-lasting effects on intercom-
munal relations and the potential for renewed violence
outside of the electoral arena.
Finally, electoral violence often intersects with crimi-
nal violence. On the one hand, electoral violence is
sometimes pursued by criminal gangs on behalf of polit-
ical actors that seek to avoid detection (Barnes, 2017).
On the other hand, criminal actors often rely on protec-
tion agreements with political elites; the holding of elec-
tions can threaten these agreements and lead to violent
electoral competition among criminal actors (Trejo &
Ley, 2018).
Elections held in countries where one or several of the
above forms of organized violence is present are likely to
see different manifestations of electoral violence. How-
ever, a common theme across these contexts is that the
introduction of electoral processes changes the incentive
structures of the state and non-state actors involved in
ongoing organized violence (Harish & Little, 2017).
While most organized violence is pursued outside the
electoral arena and with non-electoral goals, such as
overthrowing the existing political system or establishing
territorial control, elections introduce an additional ele-
ment of competition that violent actors usually cannot
afford to ignore; instead they often seek to influence the
electoral process with violent tactics.
Electoral violence and electoral manipulation
Electoral violence also constitutes a distinct form of elec-
toral manipulation. Just like other forms of electoral
malpractice, such as tampering with the registration pro-
cess, vote buying or electoral fraud, electoral violence
aims to manipulate the electoral process (Birch, 2011;
Lehoucq, 2003). Yet there are qualitative considerations
that distinguish electoral violence. First, violence induces
fear of physical injury and actual loss of life, resulting in
psychological effects on individuals and society which are
different from the impacts expected from fraud, vote-
buying, and other varieties of electoral manipulation.
Second, there are costs associated with the instigation
of violence that are less relevant for other forms of
manipulation strategy. Electoral violence is unlikely to
go undetected by international observers, who are more
prone to condemn violence than, for example, vote-buy-
ing, and observer condemnation can lead to loss of inter-
national legitimacy and donor support (Daxecker, 2012,
2014; Hyde & Marinov, 2014; Smidt, 2016; see also
Gonza´lez-Ocantos et al., 2020). While research shows
contradictory effects of violence on support for the party
carrying out violence (Collier & Vicente, 2012; Bekoe &
Burchard, 2017; Birnir & Ghodes, 2018; see also
Gutie´rrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020), violence is without
a doubt a strategy associated with risk for political lead-
ers: once unleashed it is a difficult instrument for politi-
cians to regulate, and revenge and counter-attacks can
cause violence dynamics that spiral out of control. As
discussed below, the contributions of this special issue
uncover some of the strategic conditions that make elec-
toral violence more or less costly.
What we know about electoral violence
What do we know about the causes and consequences of
electoral violence? Work on the causes of electoral vio-
lence has emphasized institutional, societal, and interna-
tional determinants.
In terms of institutions, research has established the
importance of level of democracy and strength of insti-
tutions (Birch, 2020; Burchard, 2015; Hafner-Burton,
Hyde & Jablonski, 2014). Previous research also demon-
strates how the risk of violent elections is affected by
variations in the electoral process and type of election
3 These choices are related to Staniland’s (2014) distinction between
actors with intrasystemic goals, where actors operate within the
existing system to take over power, and antisystemic goals, where
actors set out to challenge the status quo and fundamentally alter
the political order.
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(Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016;
Collier & Vicente, 2012, 2014; Fielding, 2018; Hafner-
Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Robinson & Torvik,
2009; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015; Taylor, Pevehouse
& Straus, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004). Several accounts
suggest that violence is more prevalent in competitive
electoral contests (Asunka et al., 2019; Collier & Vice-
nte, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014;
Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Salehyan & Line-
barger, 2015; Wilkinson, 2004), although evidence
remains mixed (Birch, 2020). Relatedly, while some
studies confirm that competitive voters and areas are
targeted more (Wilkinson, 2004; Eve´quoz, 2019), others
have found that voters in opposition strongholds experi-
ence higher levels of violence (Rauschenbach & Paula,
2019; Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2014). Research also explores
the consequences of electoral institution design (Alesina,
Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018; Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016;
Fjelde & Ho¨glund, 2016a). Majoritarian elections have
been shown to produce high-stakes electoral contests
associated with greater levels of electoral violence (Fjelde
& Ho¨glund, 2016a). Recent work has drawn attention
to earlier parts of the electoral process, highlighting how
intraparty competition can lead to violence in the nomi-
nation process (Seeberg, Wahman & Skaaning, 2018).
Regarding societal factors, scholars have linked eth-
nic polarization, the exclusion of ethnic groups from
power, and parties representing particular ethnic or
religious identities to greater incentives for electoral
violence (Fjelde & Ho¨glund, 2016a; Kuhn, 2015; Nel-
lis, Weaver & Rosenzweig, 2016; Nellis & Siddiqui,
2018; Wilkinson, 2004). Furthermore, land patronage
can provide elites with powerful tools for violent elec-
toral mobilization (Boone, 2011; Boone & Kriger,
2012; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). Research has also
begun to uncover the gendered patterns of electoral
violence. For instance, research suggests that men and
women confront different risks, with men more com-
monly subject to physical violence, and women more
often facing acts of intimidation and psychological
abuse (Bardall, 2011; Bjarnegård, 2018).
International factors also matter. Examining the
effects of international election monitoring, scholarship
has shown that the presence of observers can displace
violence as strategy (Daxecker, 2014), and that monitors
can facilitate post-electoral mobilization (Daxecker,
2012; Smidt, 2016; von Borzyskowski, 2019b).
Research has also examined the consequences of inter-
national interventions such as the provision of democ-
racy aid or violence prevention strategies (Birch &
Muchlinski, 2018; von Borzyskowski, 2019a).
In scholarship on the consequences of electoral vio-
lence, research has primarily focused on individual-level
effects on political behavior and attitudes. This micro-
level emphasis stands in contrast to work on causes,
which has privileged more aggregate and structural expla-
nations. The largest body of work focuses on effects on
behavior, in particular turnout (Bekoe & Burchard,
2017; Bratton, 2008; Burchard, 2015; Ho¨glund &
Piyaranthne, 2009). More recently, research has exam-
ined the effects of violence on political attitudes, includ-
ing satisfaction with democracy (Burchard, 2015), trust
and social capital (Dercon & Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2012;
Ho¨glund & Piyarathne, 2009), and political knowledge
(So¨derstro¨m, 2018). Some studies have examined more
aggregate-level consequences of violence, including for
incumbent victory (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski,
2018), for vote shares (Alesina, Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018;
Condra et al., 2018), and for political speech (Alesina,
Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018). This literature finds that vio-
lence can depress participation and (thereby) help perpe-
trators win certain elections (Bratton, 2008; Condra
et al., 2018), despite the fact that it is widely condemned
by voters (Gutie´rrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Rosenz-
weig, 2016); at the same time, it can also have numerous
negative side-effects, including the stifling of free speech
and the erosion of trust.
Despite what we have learned, several gaps in knowl-
edge remain. First, with some notable exceptions (such
as Wilkinson’s 2004 seminal book and the 2018 edited
volume by So¨derberg Kovacs and Bjarnesen), research on
the causes of violence has prioritized the national level.
This means that we understand how aggregate societal or
institutional factors create the conditions for electoral
violence, but not how these same factors play out within
countries. For this a more disaggregated approach is
required. A second consequence of the aggregate-level
focus of most existing literature is that it has not yet
sufficiently developed theories that explain the various
perpetrators and targets of electoral violence. While elites
may be the ones orchestrating violence, empirical work
highlights a range of perpetrators, such as agents of the
state, political candidates, local partisan ethnic groups,
militias, gangs, and youth groups (e.g. Agbiboa, 2018;
Angerbrandt, 2018; Berenschot, 2011; Mutongwizo,
2018). In terms of targets, much theorizing has focused
on the ethnicity and competitiveness of voters, neglect-
ing other dimensions, including the micro-dynamics that
shape perceptions of the stakes involved in elections.
Finally, data and methods gaps have restricted our
understanding of electoral violence. There certainly has
been progress compared to ten or 15 years ago, when
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most work consisted of case studies or cross-national
statistical analyses. For example, several disaggregated
datasets on electoral violence are now available and allow
scholars to analyze the subnational implications of the-
oretical arguments (Birch & Muchlinski, 2019; Dax-
ecker, Amicarelli & Jung, 2019).4 Systematic
individual-level data on citizens’ perceptions of the elec-
toral process provided by the Afrobarometer, including
fear of electoral violence, are another important public
good for scholars of electoral violence. Yet more innova-
tion is needed. For example, ethnographic accounts can
push forward theorizing on perpetrators, and experimen-
tal designs allow for more solid causal inferences.
Contributions of the special issue
The articles in this special issue are methodologically and
geographically diverse, encompassing ethnography,
cutting-edge survey vignette and list experiments, quanti-
tative analyses of subnational and crossnational survey and
event data, and spanning Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
The articles jointly contribute to fill the gaps identified in
the preceding section and advance research on electoral
violence in four main areas: (1) the disaggregation of
actors: the incentives faced by individual-level perpetrators
and targets of electoral violence, as well as the conse-
quences of violence for these actors; (2) the disaggregation
of institutions: the formal and informal institutional foun-
dations of electoral violence, including subnational insti-
tutions, and the ways in which formal and informal
institutions interact at different levels to condition elec-
toral violence; (3) the determinants of the stakes at play in
elections and their effect on violence; and (4) how elec-
toral violence is shaped by other forms of violent conflict.
Perpetrators and targets
A first theme advances knowledge of perpetrators and
targets, including incentives for and consequences of
electoral violence at the individual level. These contribu-
tions show that violence can be an expensive resource for
perpetrators, and one they will use selectively against
targets that are most likely to respond, least likely to
protest, and most likely to be of use in delivering the
ends envisaged. As articles by von Borzyskowski & Kuhn
(2020) and Gonza´lez-Ocantos et al. (2020) show, pov-
erty, urban–rural status, and political knowledge are
important characteristics that influence targeting. Some
of the findings in this special issue suggest potentially
troubling implications for voter information campaigns,
showing that violence is likely to be targeted at groups
who then anticipate threats and adapt their behavior
accordingly (Gonza´lez-Ocantos et al., 2020; von Borzys-
kowski & Kuhn, 2020; Klaus, 2020; Gutie´rrez-Romero
& LeBas, 2020; Young, 2020). In the context of Gua-
temala, Gonza´lez-Ocantos et al. (2020) use list experi-
ments to uncover the varying strategic considerations
underpinning intimidation versus vote-buying. They
establish intimidation as a strategy primarily used to
demobilize voters who are unresponsive to vote-buying
and where the risk of intimidation being reported is low.
These considerations make poor and rural voters more
vulnerable. von Borzyskowski & Kuhn (2020) find that
among African citizens, informed voters are more often
targeted with violence because they are harder to sway
through alternative tactics. Based on an original survey
fielded in Kenya, Klaus (2020) shows that despite
increasing their trust in the state, citizens receiving land
titles are more fearful of the electoral process. This means
that the experience of electoral violence will in most
contexts be highly differentiated, with some citizens hav-
ing very little cause to fear it and others perceiving elec-
tions to be extremely dangerous events. Moreover,
Wahman & Goldring (2020) show that the fact that
competitive elections are more violent in the aggregate
does not imply that perpetrators target voters in the most
competitive areas.
The fear of being targeted and expectations of
violence also have consequences for behavioral and emo-
tional responses. Focusing on Kenya, Gutie´rrez-Romero
& LeBas (2020) use a vignette experiment to show that
voters are less likely to vote for candidates rumored to
have used violence, but that this sanctioning effect is
weaker for the poor and those who had been exposed
to violence. Young (2020) examines the consequences of
violence for the propensity to dissent and negative emo-
tional responses in repressive environments. She demon-
strates that opposition supporters with a greater sense of
self-efficacy respond with anger rather than fear when
presented with state violence. Offering a more positive
picture, Smidt (2020) finds that election education cam-
paigns by the United Nations in Coˆte d’Ivoire can make
citizens less fearful of electoral violence and increase their
sense of efficacy.
The institutional foundations of electoral violence
A second theme concerns the formal and informal insti-
tutional foundations of electoral violence. The
4 Subnational data on election results and the boundaries of electoral
districts are also increasingly available (Kollman et al., 2011, 2017).
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contributions explore the effect of authoritarian legacies
(Brosche´, Fjelde & Ho¨glund, 2020), alternations in
power (Ruiz-Rufino & Birch, 2020), party institutiona-
lization (Fjelde, 2020), institutional biases (Daxecker,
2020), and informal networks of patronage (Berenschot,
2020). The strength and political inclusiveness of insti-
tutions are important mediators of the relationship
between the instrumental aims of actors and their choice
of political weapon. Strong and inclusive institutions can
deter the use of force by promoting informed participa-
tion, representation, and transparency by means of cred-
ible democratic channels (Ruiz-Rufino & Birch, 2020;
Fjelde, 2020; Smidt, 2020). Focusing on political par-
ties, Fjelde (2020) demonstrates that more institutiona-
lized parties reduce the risk of violence by facilitating
nonviolent mobilization and constraining the use of
force. Her contribution highlights parties as actors that
can help us link elite preferences with the interests of
local actors, something that is poorly explained by
research prioritizing elites. In a cross-national study,
Ruiz-Rufino & Birch (2020) show how alternation in
power reduces electoral violence by serving as a mechan-
ism to decrease the tensions between electoral winners
and losers. Alternation in power is also endogenous to
electoral management body performance, which points
to the significance of conflict management and violence
reducing efforts. Smidt (2020) confirms that these pos-
itive effects of conflict management can hold at the local
level, indicating that aggregate and subnational expecta-
tions do at times converge.
By contrast, pervasive informal institutions, where
patronage politics and lack of rule of law become means
of de facto exclusion of certain groups from state
resources, encourage actors to resort to violent means
(Berenschot, 2020; Brosche´, Fjelde & Ho¨glund,
2020). Berenschot (2020), drawing on ethnographic evi-
dence and within-country variation in India and Indo-
nesia, demonstrates the significance of the type of
patronage network, where ethnicized networks serve to
sustain divisive politics. Patronage networks are thus
important mid-level structures whose characteristics
matter for elites considering the use of violence. Brosche´,
Fjelde &Ho¨glund (2020), in a comparison of Kenya and
Zambia, show how authoritarian regimes using more
inclusionary governance strategies to maintain power,
nurture dynamics that in multiparty elections reduce the
risk of violence, while exclusionary regime strategies have
the opposite effect. However, strong and exclusive insti-
tutions that deliver desired electoral results to incum-
bents without the need for them to resort to force may
also be associated with less violence (Daxecker, 2020). In
a subnational analysis of malapportionment and violence
in India, Daxecker shows that overrepresented districts
are less likely to experience violence because they are
more homogenous and biased in favor of incumbents.
The alignment of strong institutions with peace and
weak institutions with violence further suggests that it
is the strength of democratic structures rather than their
degree of democratic inclusiveness that really matters for
conditioning the use of violence. Thus, even where insti-
tutions are in some respects exclusionary, they can help
keep the peace if they are sufficiently strong. This is a
perplexing and possibly worrying observation that merits
further research.
High-stakes elections
A third theme pertains to the stakes in elections and their
effect on violence. Articles examine the underlying con-
ditions contributing to high-stake elections (Klaus,
2020) and question the conventional wisdom linking
competitiveness to greater risk of violence (Wahman &
Goldring, 2020; Daxecker, 2020). Klaus (2020) exam-
ines how the distribution of land rights in Kenya shapes
people’s trust in state institutions and perceptions of the
electoral process. She finds that while land title recipients
are more likely to trust the state, they also become more
fearful of the electoral process and changes it might
bring. Land reform might thus inadvertently raise the
stakes of elections, and increase the potential for vio-
lence. Challenging the view that competitive elections
experience more violence, which rests on macro-level
assessments, Wahman & Goldring (2020) argue that
parties use violence against minorities and core opponent
voters in their own strongholds as a means of maintain-
ing dominance. Their analysis of Zambia finds that
incumbent and opposition strongholds experience more
violence, especially in constituencies with good connec-
tivity. Finally, Daxecker (2020) shows that the greater
electoral influence of overrepresented constituencies
reduces the demand for electoral violence in these areas.
These contributions highlight the importance of
establishing the microfoundations of arguments on
high-stakes elections and violence that we noted in the
previous section.
Electoral violence in the context of other forms of
violent conflict
Finally, articles provide insight into how electoral vio-
lence is linked to and shaped by the presence of other
forms of organized violence (Krause, 2020; Gonza´lez-
Ocantos et al., 2020; Smidt, 2020). Krause (2020)
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focuses on communal violence triggered by elections in
Nigeria and Kenya, and shows how the nature of com-
munal conflict explains divergent patterns of sexual vio-
lence. Post-election violence in Nigeria involved short,
intense battles between similarly strong groups, leading
to more intense violence overall, while constraining the
use of sexual violence. By contrast, the one-sided nature
of electoral violence in Kenya played out in the form of
attacks and massacres against minorities, including wide-
spread rape and sexual violence. Gonza´lez-Ocantos
et al.’s (2020) study of voter intimidation in Guatemala
suggests that the legacies of a civil war with high levels of
civilian victimization and lingering violence by non-state
actors creates an environment where intimidation can
easily be disguised. The article by Smidt (2020) on
UN intervention in Coˆte d’Ivoire informs the larger
debate on postwar peacebuilding and the role that peace-
keeping has in building peace versus promoting democ-
racy. Her findings suggest that peacekeeping may assist
both democracy and peace by making elections more
secure with investments in election education. These
articles showcase the heterogeneity of electoral violence
when it occurs in the context of other violence.
Looking forward
This special issue identifies a range of institutional and
contextual factors that distinguish electoral violence from
cognate political practices, and demonstrates that elec-
toral violence is linked to the core aims of political com-
petition: contestation, participation, and the quest for
power. Episodes of electoral violence are thus integral
components of political strategies. The special issue con-
tributions point to several new promising areas of
research.
First, in uncovering the dynamics of electoral vio-
lence, the special issue foregrounds spatial dimensions
as being important for patterns of electoral violence,
distinguishing for example urban and rural areas, or
underrepresented and overrepresented electoral districts.
However, we need to expand inquiry into other arenas of
violence. For example, social media forms a space for
threats and intimidation during election periods
(Muchlinski et al., 2019). Additionally, studies on the
gendered impacts of electoral violence show how female
voters and candidates often face violence in the private
space of their home, away from the public limelight
(Bardall, 2011; Bjarnegård, 2018). Furthering insights
into these dimensions would serve to question conven-
tional assumptions about where electoral violence
manifests itself and the means through which electoral
ends are achieved.
Second, the special issue underlines that the conse-
quences of electoral violence go beyond vote choice,
demonstrating effects on trust, threat perceptions, dis-
sent, and emotions. Recent advances in data collection
and innovative research designs have made it possible to
examine patterns of targeting and its consequences in
greater depth. However, the emphasis on short-term,
individual-level consequences means that we have only
a rudimentary understanding of the long-term implica-
tions. One reason for the neglect of lasting effects on
individuals is the lack of panel survey data; another is
the fairly recent introduction of elections in some parts
of the developing world. But since most research accepts
that election violence has structural causes, we would
expect lasting consequences. Examining patterns in his-
torical cases, such as election-related violence in the
Southern United States (Epperly et al., forthcoming)
or ongoing work on electoral violence in Victorian Eng-
land, could be a promising avenue.5
One overarching policy implication emerges from the
contributions of the special issue, in addition to the
specific policy consequences highlighted by the individ-
ual articles. Elections are regular and cyclical in nature,
making the timing of electoral violence more predictable
than other forms of political violence and thus amenable
to electoral assistance programming. But the causes of
electoral violence commonly encompass a combination
of immediate factors tied to elections, such as the pros-
pect of alternation in power, and conditions that trans-
form slowly, such as perceived historical injustices, or the
institutionalization of party structures. For this reason,
the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence
require both short-term and long-term efforts, as well
as a focus that moves beyond election-level factors and
takes into consideration the broader social, economic
and political issues. Targeted electoral violence preven-
tion measures can help prevent the worst forms of vio-
lence, but eliminating violence from the range of
strategies considered by electoral actors requires deeper
changes in sociopolitical structures of inclusion and
exclusion.
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